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 ‘Meaning-making using abstract symbol systems was so successful in empowering our species, that evolution selected it as form of species-survival behaviour’ Associate Professor Brian Cambourne 

16/9/2015

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In my last post I shared the tentative hypothesis that process of ‘meaning-making using abstract symbol systems was so successful in empowering our species, that evolution selected it as form of species-survival behaviour’. Exploring the feasibility of this tentative hypothesis is the first step in addressing Question 3, namely’

3.What’s Involved In Interpreting The Human Problem Of Learning To Read From A Biological Rather Than A Psychological Perspective?

Arguing that a certain form of behaviour has been ‘selected by evolution’ is a contentious claim. Justifying such a claim involves reading deeply in the literature of biological and cultural evolution, for evidence that the behaviour which has been ‘selected’ developed (i.e.‘evolved’) from non-human and proto-human species. While there is a plethora of such research and documentation , the constraints of space allow only this general summary.

Summary of Research and Documentation Supporting Evolutionary Selection Of Meaning-Making Using Symbols in Homo Sapiens.

Homo sapiens ability to construct and communicate complex meanings using a wide range of symbol-systems (oral and written language, art, dance, sign, music, etc.,) is grounded in the fundamental necessity for cooperative, shared intentions. (Tomasello 1999, Deacon 1997, Donald 1991, 2002, Grice 1957, Fauconnier & Turner 2002)
Modern humans’ ability and willingness to engage in cooperative communication rests on a psychological infrastructure of shared intentionality manifested through joint attention in shared contexts. It evolved originally for the explicit purpose of enhancing collaboration and developing shared cultural norms. (Grice 1957, 1975, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005)

The basic motives of this infrastructure are helping and sharing. Humans communicate to request help, inform others of things in order to help and support them, and share attitudes as a way of bonding within the cultural group. (Vygotsky 1978, Richerson & Boyd 2005,Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993, Tomasello 1999, Tomasello et al 2005)

With respect to the predominant and most powerful medium of communication manifested by the 6000 or so fully developed oral languages ever spoken on earth, the motives to cooperate listed above created different functional pressures for conventionalising grammatical constructions. Tomasello comments that “Requesting help in the immediate you-and-me and here-and now, for example, required very little grammar, but informing and sharing required increasingly complex grammatical devices”. ( Tomasello, 2008)

Research into gestural and vocal communication of both great apes and human infants indicates that humans’ cooperative communication must have emerged first from gestures of pointing and pantomiming. (Call & Tomasello, 2008) Conventional communication, first gestural and then vocal, evolved after humans already possessed these natural gestures and their shared intentionality infrastructure.  These must have been supported by skills of cultural learning which enabled creating and passing along jointly understood communicative conventions. (Tomasello1999, Deacon 1997, Donald 1991, 2002, Grice 1957, Fauconnier & Turner 2002,)

This biological research and theory building seriously challenges the dominant psychological perspective based on the Chomsky-an view that linguistic knowledge is innate. (Chomsky 1993, Pinker2000)

Instead the major thrust of this approach is that the most fundamental aspects of  the uniquely human ability to construct and communicate complex meaning using vocal and written symbols are biological adaptations for cooperative social interaction in general.  However the purely linguistic dimensions of human communication are cultural conventions and constructions created by and passed along within particular cultural groups. ( Deacon 1997, Tomasello, 2003)

Evidence from archeology and paleontology further supports this summary. It supports the hypothesis that survival as a species for our relatively physically weak ancestors depended on their ability to meet a complex set of needs, including, organising hunts, sharing food, communicating about distributed food resources , planning warfare and defence, passing on tool making skills, sharing important past experiences , establishing social bonds between individuals,  communicating with and establishing mutually supportive relationships with potential sexual partners and/or mates and other members of the tribe or group, caring for and training young, and so on. (Deacon 1997, Feldman 2008, Donald 1991, 2002, Fauconnier & Turner 2001, Ramachandran V.S (2003) , Tomasello 1999, 2003)

Symbol use it seems offered them a range of new, previously unknown cognitive behaviours which not only ensured their survival but which were responsible for our species subsequent ability to out-compete all other species on the planet. The survival of the first hominid groups who adopted an habitual hunter/gatherer mode of existence depended on them developing ways conceptualising and communicating a set of abstract social "contracts" which would stabilise the inter-group relationships necessary for the needs of procreation, food, security, and child care to be satisfied in mutually supportive and socially cohesive ways.

A symbolic system, albeit, an extremely crude one in the beginning, seemed to provide an effective option for meeting these needs, especially as there was also an already existing suitable “raw material” which could become a medium for symbolic behaviour-- namely the vocal noises our ancestors could make.  

In the beginning it may not have been very much like speech. Only a few types of symbols and only a few classes of combinatorial relationships between them would have been necessary. These groups also would have required considerable complexity of social organisation to bring their unprepared brains to fully comprehend the abstract meanings they were struggling to construct and communicate.

Fauconnier and Turner paint this word picture of the process of developing a first primitive, sound-based symbol system which was capable of achieving these outcomes:

Two million years ago, australopithecines, equipped with non-linguistic ape-like mental abilities, struggled to assemble by fits and starts, an extremely crude symbolic system—fragile, difficult to learn, inefficient, slow, inflexible, and tied to ritual representation of social contracts like marriage. We would not have recognised it as language. But language then improved by two means. First invented linguistic forms were subjected to a long process of selection. Generation after generation, the newborn brain deflected linguistic inventions it found uncongenial. The guessing abilities and intricate nonlinguistic biases of the newborn brain acted as filters on the products of linguistic invention. Today's languages are systems of linguistic forms that have survived. The child's mind does not embody innate language structures. Rather the language has come to embody the predispositions of the child's mind. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 173)

These crude and difficult language forms imposed evolutionary selection pressures on neural architecture. This evolving neurological hardware both 'shaped', and was shaped by the culturally appropriate social conditions which nurtured our species' meaning-making behaviour. The end product of this process is a species (us), which despite its puny body, its lack of speed, teeth, and claws, had constructed a system of  symbolic communication called language, and this in turn made us the most powerful species on the planet.
In the next (and final) blog in this four part topic I will address the question

‘What does a “biological perspective for addressing the problem of learning to read” look like?
I shall also list all the references referred to in the four parts of this topic

 

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Is it possible to apply the basic principle of “emulating Nature's best biological ideas to solve a human problem” to an area of the social sciences, (in this case learning to read)? 

2/9/2015

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In my last Blog post I promised that future posts would address these four questions:

1.      Is it possible to apply the basic principle of “emulating Nature's best biological ideas to solve a human problem” to an area of the social sciences, (in this case learning to read)?

2.      What does it mean to adopt an “interpretive perspective” in scientific endeavours?

3.      What’s involved in interpreting the human problem of learning to read from a biological rather than a psychological perspective?

4.      What does a “biological perspective for addressing the problem of learning to read” look like?

In this post I’ll address Questions 1 & 2. In future posts I will address Questions 3 and 4.

 Q1.     Is it possible to apply the basic principle of “emulating Nature's best biological ideas to solve a human problem” to an area of the social sciences, (in this case learning to read)?

The short answer is a very definite ‘YES’!  My reasons for this are two fold:

(i)                 It is essential for the maintenance of participatory democracy as we know it. Most educational scientists from modern Western democracies agree that high levels of reading ability are an essential prerequisite for supporting and strengthening the forms of participatory democracy we value. As Giroux recently argued, “we need a vision of schooling dedicated to the cultivation of an informed, critical citizenry capable of actively participating and governing in a democratic society”. (Giroux 2010) Without a citizenry of effective, critical readers, realising this vision becomes extremely difficult. 

 Given this relationship between literacy and democracy it is imperative for our schools to produce graduates who are highly effective, productive, critical readers.

How else will they be able to sift truth from spin when evaluating the messages political parties are continually disseminating?

(ii)               The exponential rate at which information is increasing, and the need for readers who can quickly understand and critically evaluate the truth-value of the multiple textual messages with which they’re being continually bombarded, is fundamental if democracy is to survive.

These two reasons should trump those who argue that the aim of education is to produce graduates who can work in ways that maximize profits and thus ‘keep us economically competitive’.

Q 2.     What does it mean to adopt an “interpretive perspective” in scientific endeavours?

What does “interpreting the human problem of learning to read from a biological rather than a psychological perspective” actually entail? At the risk of oversimplifying a complex multifaceted process it simply means an educator like myself has to stop talking and thinking about the broad concept of “learning” using psychological discourse most educators have been trained to use, and instead try to talk and think about learning using the discourse of biology.  

 In order to do this I had to immerse myself in the discourse of those who wrote and researched in the fields of biological and cultural evolution especially as it pertained to the development of the special cognitive abilities that distinguish homo sapiens from other primate species.

After months of false starts and dead ends I slowly identified a subtle but significant difference between the psychological perspective with which I’d been imbued as a consequence of my academic training and years of professional involvement in education, and the biological perspective of those who wrote and researched in the fields of biological and cultural evolution.

 It was this: Whereas psychological discourse tended to define (and thus frame) learning as a change in an animate organism’s behaviour “caused” by contiguously occurring external factors and events, the biological-cum-evolution discourse I immersed myself in framed human learning as a ‘special kind of learning and knowing which is ONLY available to our species’.

(Deacon 1997, Feldman 2008, Donald 1991, 2002, Fuster 2000, Iacoboni et al. 1999, Ramachandran V.S (2003), Tomasello 1999, 2003)

 Framing human learning this way triggered this question in my mind: “Why is this kind of learning and knowing so special for our species”? The result of addressing this question had far reaching implications for the resolving the original human problem I set out to address.

 OK. What’s So Special About This Kind of ‘Learning’ and ‘Knowing’?

Biologists argue it’s “special” because it’s what distinguishes homo sapiens sapiens from all other forms of life on our planet. Not only that, it provides our species with two unique cognitive abilities. It enables us to:

                        i) create complex knowledge (or “meanings”) using abstract symbol systems.

                        ii) apply this knowledge (or these “meanings”) to the everyday problems of species' survival and communicate and discuss them to others.

Not only are we the only species of living organism on the planet which can construct abstract meaning using a diverse range symbol systems but we can store these meanings in memory, revisit them, manipulate them, extend them, refine them, build on them, and then share and communicate what we've constructed as a consequence of all these processes with other members of the species.

This (biological) way of framing learning was an “aha” moment for me. I realized that psychological discourse I’d habitually used for all of my professional life had subconsciously coerced me to think about “learning and knowledge” as some kind of reified “stuff”. The range of cognate nouns I’d continually used to discuss, communicate, and think about the end product of an act of learning such as “propositional knowledge”, “understanding”, “information”, “know-how”, “expertise”, “comprehension” etc. continually reinforced this underlying conceptual metaphor. These terms represented “stuff-like” concepts. Learners had to “acquire” and “internalize” them. Biological discourse was subtly (but significantly) different. Biology framed learning and knowledge as the “end product of a process of ‘meaning-making using abstract symbol systems”.


While this may seem a trivial exercise in semantics to some, the ramifications (for me) were deep. For example it forced me to make a significant shift in thinking about learning. Rather than subconsciously thinking about learning and knowledge as some kind of “stuff” which exists in the world and which the learner somehow had to “acquire”, I began thinking about learning and knowledge as something which was constructed by a learner using symbols. This in turn triggered a tentative hypothesis that this sort of cognition was so successful in empowering our species, that evolution selected it as form of species-survival behavior.

In my next post , I will address Q3 above, namely "What’s involved in interpreting the human problem of learning to read from a biological rather than a psychological perspective?”

(NOTE: I will list all my references after the final blog in this series
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    Dr. Brian Cambourne, associate professor, is currently a Principal Fellow at the University of Wollongong in NSW. He started his teaching career in NSW in 1956 and spent the next nine years working in a variety of small, mostly one-teacher primary schools before entering academic life. He has since become one of Australian’s most eminent researchers of literacy and learning. He completed his PhD at James Cook University before becoming a post-doctoral Fellow and Fullbright Scholar at Harvard Graduate School of Education; Research Fellow at the Centre for Studies in Reading at the University of Illinois and Research Fellow at the Learning Centre at Tucson.

    Returning to Australia and the University of Wollongong, Brian devoted his research to literacy learning and teaching. His major interest is in professional development for literacy education and he is committed to the idea of co-learning and co-researching with teachers. His ‘Seven condition of learning’ revolutionised the teaching of literacy in classrooms and remains current today. His national and international scholarship has earned him many prestigious awards, including being inducted into the International Reading Association’s Reading Hall of Fame, and the Outstanding Educational Achievement Award by the Australian College of Educators. Both awards recognize his long-term outstanding contribution over many years to education.

    Brian now lives in a small seaside village 100kms south of Wollongong not far from the Shoalhaven Campus of the University Of Wollongong.

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